Technological change is transforming media industries. Digitization lowers the cost of recording, storage, reproduction and distribution, while computer-based editing facilitates higher quality and special e¤ects. With electronic distribution, a vast range of content can be made available to consumers at little cost. Meanwhile, the distribution of industry production and sales appears to be shifting: the late 20th century was the era of the "hit parade", but in the 21st attention has shifted to the "long tail". This paper develops a free entry model of di¤erentiated products with endogenous quality and heterogeneous types to examine the implications of technological change for market
Introduction
Technological change is transforming media industries. In the production of video content-traditionally released as movies and TV programs-and recorded music, digitization lowers the costs of recording, storage and reproduction. Computer-based editing makes higher-quality production possible at lower cost and facilitates new special e¤ects. Distribution on physical media has shifted to more compact, higher quality formats (from VHS to DVD; from vinyl and tape to CD), while electronic distribution over cable and the internet greatly reduces distribution costs. Digitization of television signals permits many more channels to be shown for a given capacity (of radio spectrum or cable infrastructure), and allows images to be broadcast in higher de…nition. On-line stores can stock a far wider range of products than local retail outlets, and have developed personalized search and recommendation services to assist consumers in …nding content tailored to their individual tastes.
These developments are profoundly altering the structure of media industries. The latter part of 20th century was the era of the "hit parade": as the best artists became available to all via recorded media (as compared with live performance), consumer attention focused predominantly on a limited number of top movies, songs, and TV shows. The associated actors and artists became "superstars"and commanded high rents. 1 Now the distribution within media industries appears to be shifting towards the "long tail" 2 :
a higher proportion of demand is represented by products that achieve few 1 See Rosen (1981) for an economic analysis of superstars and the skewness of returns in industries where talent of individual artists is important. 2 As described by Anderson (2006) . sales individually but which collectively constitute a large part of the market. This fragmentation of demand threatens the pro…ts of media companies, especially those (such as free-to-air television) relying on advertising revenues, being directly related to audience size. It is unclear how these trends will develop in the future. Will the distributional shift from hits to the long tail continue, or might it be mitigated by the strength of key brands? With technological changes that increase the scope for raising product quality, what is the role of endogenous …xed costs 3 in this story? What is likely to happen to the distribution of …rms, and to the superstar phenomenon?
This research aims to investigate the impact of technological change on media industries, in particular as it a¤ects market structure, product mix, quality investment, and the size distribution of …rms. To address these questions, we build a model of the media sector (which may be music, movies or video content) capturing its essential features: a large set of di¤erentiated products; …xed costs which are often endogenous, increasing with quality; di¤erences in "talent" or productivity; and the number of products determined by free entry. This model can be used to analyse the impact of cost and demand changes on industry outcomes, and to explore underlying mechanisms, e.g. the role of endogenous …xed costs. The aim of the research is twofold: to investigate which underlying developments can explain past industry trends, and to assess the likely impact of ongoing and potential future changes in technology.
As di¤erentiated product classes, media industries are typically modeled using a locational model of product di¤erentiation. 4 The Hotelling (1929) model is used as the basis for modeling competition between TV broadcasters by Anderson and Coate (2005) , Armstrong and Weeds (2007) , Peitz and 3 See Sutton (1991) . 4 An alternative, representative consumer approach to product di¤erentiation is developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . This, however, is rarely used in models of media industries. Valletti (2008) and Vogel (2009) , among others. But this model takes the number of …rms to be …xed (duopoly), making it unsuitable for a market where the number of …rms is determined by free entry. For this reason, the Salop (1979) model is more appropriate to our purpose. In the Salop model, however, quality is taken to be …xed. The …rst step in this paper is to endogenize product quality, with a …xed production cost that is increasing in quality (à la Sutton (1991) ). There is some modeling along these lines in Armstrong and Weeds (2007), Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien (2009), and Seabright and Weeds (2007) . With endogenous quality, the Salop model can be used to examine the impact of lower costs (…xed and marginal), a lower cost of raising product quality, and demand changes as captured by the "transport"cost.
In representing …rms as competing for customers around a circle, the Salop (1979) model is unhelpful in two respects, however. First, the model is a poor representation of reality in many di¤erentiated product markets. It may be a reasonable approximation for spatial competition (say, between out-oftown stores located around a city), but is less appropriate for heterogeneous product classes such as media content where …rms compete directly with all rivals, not just two nearest neighbours. Secondly, the model becomes intractable when …rms are heterogeneous in anything other than locations: if, for example, …rms have di¤erent costs, the symmetry of the model is forfeited and solutions become complex.
One of the motivations for this research is the question of how digitization a¤ects the relative outcomes for di¤erent artists or modes of production. Rosen's (1981) analysis of the economics of superstars derives the distribution of outputs and returns from underlying talent di¤erentials and cost functions. 5 To capture this feature in the Salop framework we allow for heterogenous …rm "talent", where a talented …rm can raise its quality at rela- 5 Rosen …nds the shift from performance to recorded music, as recording costs fell, to increase the skewness of returns: although there is greater entry by low-quality artists, returns to the highest talent-"superstars"-increase enormously. tively low cost compared with an inferior …rm. This di¤erence in productivity may be either intrinsic (a talented individual may generate a quality that is unattainable for lesser artists) or result from the chosen production method (studio production facilitates higher quality than home video recording).
To incorporate heterogeneous …rms, the Salop model is generalised so that each …rm competes directly with all others, not just its two nearest neighbours. Salop-style models with symmetric competition have been developed by Von Ungern-Sternberg (1991) and Chen and Riordan (2007) ; these models, or similar functional forms, are used by Brito (2003) , Armstrong and Wright (2008) and Germano (2008) . In this paper we develop a framework that allows for heterogenous …rm types. The challenge is to …nd a model which is tractable under free entry, with a closed-form solution permitting further (e.g. comparative static) analysis. The model can then be used to examine the strategic choices of di¤erent …rms and, with free entry of each type, the mix and market shares of talented and untalented …rms in industry equilibrium.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes observed trends and developments in media industries, speci…cally movies and recorded music. Section 3 discusses the modeling approach. Section 4 develops a symmetric model of competition with free entry, initially with homogeneous …rms. This is extended to heterogeneous …rms in section 5, where a …rm discovers its talent type after entry. In section 6 types are known before entry, and the proportion of each in the industry is determined endogenously. With endogenous entry and quality investment, a number of aspects of industry structure can be examined. Section 7 discusses the …ndings and concludes. An appendix contains longer proofs.
Industry trends and developments
This research is motivated by observed trends and on-going developments in media industries. These are illustrated with reference to two industries: movies and recorded music.
Movie production and distribution
Between the 1950s and 1970s, movie production for theater release su¤ered greatly from the uptake of television, which reduced theater audiences to a fraction of their pre-television size. In the US, adult per capita theater admissions peaked at around 32 per annum in 1943 and fell to just four per annum in 1971. 6 The early movie industry essentially split in two, with B-movies largely migrating to the television set in a shorter, episodic form, while A-movies continued as primarily theatrical releases. Movie production declined dramatically: output of the seven major Hollywood studios fell by almost half, from an average of 278 new features per annum in 1950-54 to 147 per annum in 1970-74, with a low point of just 85 …lms in 1977.
After the 1970s the demand for movies recovered substantially, boosted by new, cheaper distribution channels: VHS followed by DVD formats, subscription television, 7 and video on demand (VoD). This era saw the rise of the blockbuster movie, with huge expenditure on production and commensurate salaries to top artists (star actors, and sometimes producers/directors). The location of production also became more concentrated, with Hollywood dominating big-budget movie output and worldwide cinema audiences. 8 The internet is the next important development in movie distribution, as high-speed broadband connections become widely available. Movie videos may be purchased from online stores or downloaded over faster connections. These developments reduce distribution costs and make a wider range of titles available to consumers. It is as yet an open question what the impact will be on the structure of the movie industry. The limited evidence available (see Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2008) for an analysis of US video sales) indicates both a growth in the long tail (with the number of titles generating just a few sales each week almost doubling) and the existence of a superstar e¤ect (among the best-performing titles, a smaller number account for the bulk of sales). However, it is unclear how these developments will progress and what will be the impact on movie production and quality investment.
Recorded music
As in the movie industry, the music scene has historically been dominated by a relatively limited number of stars and hit songs or albums (though tastes and identities change over time). However, since 2000 a marked distributional shift is taking place. There are fewer hit albums: the number of albums achieving sales of 500,000 or more (i.e. gold, platinum, multi-platinum and diamond) exceeded 1,000 in 2002, but fell by more than 40% to around 600 in 2005. 9 Moreover, the top-selling albums no longer achieve such high sales as they once did: in 2000, the top …ve albums sold 38 million copies combined; in 2005, the equivalent …gure had almost halved to 19.7 million. Of course, the music industry as a whole has su¤ered from the growth of piracy, especially unauthorized …le-sharing via the internet, but hits have su¤ered disproportionately: for comparison, total sales in the music industry fell by a quarter between 2001 and 2005. Alongside the decline in hit albums, there has recently been a growth in the "long tail": products which achieve a small number of sales individually, but which collectively comprise a larger share of total sales than has historically been the case. In other words, there has been a shift from hits to 9 Figures from Anderson (2006) , chapter 2.
niches: demand is fragmenting into a multiplicity of sub-genres and a wider set of bands. Bands and songs which used to be regarded as "misses" are becoming increasingly important to industry producers and retailers.
Anderson (2006) highlights the role of internet distribution as the cause of this shift. However, it is unclear why this latest innovation in distribution method should have such an e¤ect. The advent of recorded music in the 20th century-an invention that made the output of individual artists available to worldwide audiences-had the opposite e¤ect, generating the superstar or "winner-take-all"phenomenon described by Rosen (1981) and Frank and Cook (1996) . This suggests that a more subtle balance of cost and demand changes might be responsible.
Modeling media industries
To address these questions, the media sector (whether this is music, movies, or whatever else) must be modeled in a way that captures key industry features, including the cost and demand conditions discussed in section 2. With high …xed and low marginal (per-unit) costs, and both horizontal and vertical product di¤erentiation, media industries tend to be oligopolies. Industry outcomes depend on equilibrium entry, investment (e.g. in quality), and production decisions of competing …rms.
In modeling media industries, the following features are important. Horizontal di¤erentiation. Media content is a highly diverse product class: movie genres include thrillers, comedies, and animation; musical genres include pop, jazz, and classical. Consumers are heterogeneous in their individual preferences, and most have a desire for variety. This entails the desirability of producing a broad range of di¤erentiated products. Certain characteristics of media content are important to particular groups of consumers. For example, consumers tend to have a preference for the output of their home country, re ‡ecting their own language, culture, icons, etc. In ad-dition, some tastes may be narrowly focused (niches), while others appeal to a broad swathe of consumers (e.g. "lowest common denominator"output).
Fixed production costs. Content production costs are largely or entirely …xed: there is a large …rst copy cost, while thereafter the marginal cost of supplying additional viewers is negligible. This cost function implies that price cannot equal marginal cost in the textbook sense. In conjunction with consumer desire for variety, there is a trade-o¤ between the number of di¤er-entiated products (which raises consumer surplus by matching diverse tastes more closely) and duplication of …xed production costs.
Quality and endogenous …xed costs. While being …xed in relation to the number of viewers, production costs tend to increase with higher quality: a movie, say, with greater appeal to viewers typically costs more to produce. In other words, …xed costs are partially endogenous, with important implications for market structure and competition (see Sutton (1991) ).
Distribution costs. Distribution and retailing involve some per-unit costs (pressing and delivering a CD or DVD; cinema viewing), but these are typically small compared with the cost of content production. The internet lowers distribution costs in a number of ways. By dispensing with the need for extensive retail ‡oor space, more products can be stocked at lower cost. Electronic distribution reduces the need for physical media to be transported (e.g. downloading a song over a broadband connection rather than purchasing a CD). Search costs may also be lower (see below).
Sunkness and uncertainty for producers. As well as being …xed, production costs are typically sunk: these cannot be recovered if the project is later abandoned (although the possibility of movie sequels and staging of TV series o¤er some ‡exibility). In addition, success is highly uncertain: it is di¢ cult to predict which outputs will be popular with consumers. These features make investment risky, and may give rise to option values.
Talent of individual artists. Media content typically has a key input: the artists, be they actors, musicians, or (sometimes) directors. Artists have intrinsic talent, which is largely exogenous but may also require development. Di¤erences in their attractiveness to consumers, and their earning power, can be huge: e.g. A-list / B-list actors; superstars, stars and also-rans.
Consumer uncertainty and search. For the consumer, media content is an experience good: its valuation is uncertain until the product is consumed, or at least sampled. The provision of product information and sampling opportunities is costly, for retailers, consumers, or both. In this environment search and recommendation services are an important aspect of marketing and retailing. Beyond word-of-mouth, consumers have long taken advantage of sampling facilities o¤ered by retailers (traditional book and music stores, cinema trailers) and the media (radio station play, newspaper and magazine media reviews). Online recommendation services (such as Rhapsody for music) and individualized search are a more targeted and potentially wide-ranging approach to this problem.
A model of competition with endogenous quality
Each of N 2 …rms is located at a corner of an N -dimensional polygon. Each corner is connected to every other by a Hotelling line, the length of which corresponds to the mass of consumers between the pair. 11 The total mass of consumers is normalised at 1, thus each pair of …rms competes over mass m = . Unit transport cost is t. When …rm k o¤ers utility u k to consumers, …rm i's market share is given by
where
Utility u i from consuming product i depends on product quality v i , advertising intensity a i , and price p i as follows
The parameter represents the perceived nuisance of adverts. A …rm that supplies advertising a receives advertising revenue R(a) per viewer; we assume that there are decreasing returns to supplying advertising, in the sense that R is a concave function. A …rm can choose its quality v i by incurring a …xed cost
There is a marginal cost c of supplying each customer. Timing of the game is as follows. Firms …rst choose whether or not to enter the market; active …rms and consumers locate as described above. 12 11 If the lines were instead taken to be of constant length, entry would not reduce average transport costs. In this case a single …rm would be socially optimal as entry merely duplicates …xed costs. 12 The model structure implies that consumer locations are endogenous to the number of …rms that enter. Such an assumption may be justi…ed by the marketing experience that consumers have di¢ culty forming preferences over unknown products (or sets of characteristics), and instead form preferences over the available set of products.
Firms then compete for consumers, simultaneously setting quality v, advertising a, and price p.
Firm i's pro…t is given by
:
Regardless of market share it is a dominant strategy to set a i = a which maximises R(a) a. The corresponding revenue is denoted R . Firm i's best responses in p and v are
with p i and v i de…ned similarly as above. With N …rms, equilibrium price and quality are
giving per-…rm pro…t of
With free entry, (N ) = 0 and the equilibrium number of …rms is
and the free-entry price and quality are
It can be seen from these results that distribution cost c and advertising revenue R (which acts like a negative distribution cost) pass through in full to consumer prices, and have no e¤ect on either the number of …rms or quality investment.
Social optimum
For comparison, we describe the socially optimal number of …rms and the quality per …rm. Since the welfare e¤ects of advertising are additively separable from the welfare e¤ects of quality and diversity, we can ignore the advertising side of the market. 13 With N …rms each providing a product of quality v, social welfare is given by
Given N , the optimal quality choice is 1 N , the same as the market equilibrium. One can show that the welfare-maximizing number of …rms is
The market generates more (fewer) …rms than is socially optimal for t > (<) 1 8 ; note that competitive equilibrium (N 2) requires t 1 4 , which entails excess entry. 15 As ! 1 (in the limit, quality is …xed) the ratio 13 The welfare e¤ects of advertising are contentious, and beyond the scope of this paper. 14 With N …rms, each is 2 N (N 1) from its rivals, and so a consumer is on average
from her nearest product. The expected transport cost is then t   2N (N 1) . 15 The …nding of excess entry is a common result in locational models of product di¤er-entiation: see Bhaskar and To (2004) . 
Comparative statics
The model has three parameters of interest: distribution cost c, quality cost and transport cost t. (ii) Equilibrium price p is increasing in c, and decreasing in t and .
(iii) Equilibrium quality v is decreasing in t and , and independent of c.
Proofs are straightward and are omitted.
Impact of digitization
We wish to assess the impact of digitization. In this framework, digitization may be characterised as some combination of the following e¤ects: (i) a reduction in the per-unit distribution cost, c (digital formats, internet distribution); (ii) a reduction in the cost of raising quality, (better special e¤ects, multiple camera angles in sports coverage, speedier news reporting); and (iii) a reduction in transport cost, t (viewer familiarization, lower adaptation costs); this is equivalent to an expansion in market size (globalization). From the comparative static results above, the following impacts can be determined. A lower distribution cost c reduces prices, but has no other e¤ects. A lower quality cost reduces the equilibrium number of …rms, and raises both quality and price. This is an endogenous …xed cost e¤ect: with quality being cheaper at the margin, …rms invest more and …xed cost increases. This reduces the equilibrium number of …rms; in addition, price must be higher to recoup the higher …xed cost. A reduction in transport cost t (or, equivalently, market expansion) reduces the equilibrium number of …rms, and increases equilibrium quality and price. Lower t raises the marginal return to quality, inducing …rms to invest more, resulting in higher quality and price, and larger endogenous …xed costs. As t falls, competition intensi…es; anticipating this, fewer …rms enter.
Competition with heterogeneous …rms
Now suppose that there are two distinct types of …rms. In particular, …rms di¤er in the cost of raising quality, , with there being two types. Superior …rms have a low quality cost parameter L , while inferior ones have a higher quality cost H > L . For simplicity we ignore advertising and its associated revenue in the rest of the paper; as noted above, advertising revenue simply feeds through to lower consumer prices. 16 Firms do not know their own (or each others') types prior to entry (this assumption is relaxed in the next section). Their common prior is a probability of being type L and probability (1 ) of being type H. Firms …rst choose whether or not to enter; active …rms and consumers locate as described in section 4. After entry, …rms'types are revealed and they then compete in quality v and price p.
One might expected the two types to choose di¤erent prices and qualities; we denote these strategies fp L ; v L g and fp H ; v H g for L-and H-types respectively. With N active …rms, a …rm of type g expects to face (N 1) rivals of type L and (1 ) (N 1) rivals of type H. The market share of …rm i of type g is given by
16 Alternatively, distribution cost c could be thought of as net of advertising revenues.
Its expected pro…t is
For given N; , equilibrium strategies are (N 1) ) ;
where = L + (1 ) H . Equilibrium pro…ts for the two types are
where v = v L + (1 ) v H . A …rm does not know its type before entering the market. Given the probabilities ; (1 ) of type L; H respectively, and substituting the equilibrium outcomes above, expected pro…t is given by
The free entry condition E (N ) = 0 has two roots, (4t L + 1) and (4t H + 1), and is discontinuous at 4t H L 1 + 1 . Taking the smaller root 17 the equilibrium number of …rms is
and equilibrium prices and qualities are
In equilibrium, the two types of …rm supply vertically di¤erentiated products.
Inferior (high quality cost) …rms do not invest in quality at all and supply the basic product at price equal to marginal cost, while superior (low quality cost) …rms supply higher quality products at a higher price.
Comparative statics
The model has …ve parameters: distribution cost c, superior-type quality cost L , inferior-type quality cost H , transport cost t and the proportion of superior (L) types, . 
Impact of digitization
The impact of digitization is similar to that found in section 4, but with price and quality e¤ects occurring for superior …rms alone. A lower cost of raising quality has no e¤ect on the choices of inferior …rms, but reduces the equilibrium number of …rms and raises both the quality and price of superior …rms. As before, these e¤ects are due to the endogeneity of …xed costs. Globalization, as captured by a reduction in transport cost, intensi…es competition and increases the marginal return to quality, reducing the equilibrium number of …rms and increasing the quality and price of superior …rms.
The model with endogenous entry
Suppose there are two types of …rm, untalented (U ) and talented (T ). These may represent di¤erent forms of content provision: low-budget home video (such as that distributed on YouTube) and more expensive studio production, which allows greater scope for quality enhancement. Or they might represent alternative strategies chosen by ex ante identical …rms: for example, a broadcaster's choice between basic and premium content, where the quality of premium (but not basic) programming may be raised by additional investment.
This model, unlike the previous two, incorporates exogenous …xed costs as well as a quality-related term. 18 An untalented …rm pays a …xed cost F > 0 to supply a program of minimal quality v 0 , normalised at zero. 19 It is unable to raise quality further: since the model above with heterogeneous …rms shows that the inferior, high quality cost type does not invest anyway, this assumption is not unduly restrictive. Talented …rms have endogenous quality, producing a program of quality v at a total (exogenous + endogenous) …xed cost of K + 1 2 v 2 . To ensure an equilibrium with both types, we require K > F . For simplicity, we normalise the per-unit cost c 0: as demonstrated by the two models above, a per-unit cost simply adds to prices and a¤ects no other variables. Move order in the game is as follows: First, …rms discover their types (or choose their production strategy); they then make entry decisions, before competing in prices p and, for the talented type only, quality v.
A …rm of type g anticipates that a proportion of rivals will be of type T and (1 ) of type U , with the total number of active …rms being N > 1.
Its market share is
For an untalented …rm, pro…t is given by
while a talented …rm has pro…t
Each type's pro…t function is concave in its price and, where relevant, quality, thus second order conditions for a maximum are satis…ed. Given N and , equilibrium prices for each type and equilibrium quality (for talented types only) are given by
Free entry conditions for each type ( 
It can be seen that as F ! 0 (with K > F ), ! 0: talented types are crowded out. As K ! F (with F > 0), ! 1: untalented …rms are crowded out. To ensure an interior solution 2 [0; 1] the following parameter restriction is required (with K > F the set is non-empty)
Substituting (13) and (14), equilibrium prices and quality are given by
Market shares for a single …rm of each type are given by
The total share of talented …rms, S T , is given by
Naturally, the total share of untalented types,
The next sub-section examines comparative static properties of these equilibrium outcomes. As an additional exercise, we look at the impact of a proportionate change in both …xed costs, F and K. To assess this, we rede…ne F f and K k, where k > f . The equilibrium number and mix of …rms then become
while equilibrium prices and quality become
and market shares
Comparative statics
The model has …ve parameters: untalented-type …xed cost F , talented-type …xed cost K, talented-type quality cost , transport cost t and, allowing for proportionate changes in …xed costs, . The proportion of talented types, , is now endogenous. The following propositions give comparative static results for equilibrium outcomes of the endogenous quality model.
Proposition 3 Number of …rms.
The equilibrium number of …rms, N , is decreasing in F , increasing in K, and t, and independent of .
Proposition 4 Mix of talented and untalented types.
(i) The proportion of talented …rms, , is decreasing in , and t.
(ii) Comparative statics in F and K are ambiguous; subject to the su¢ cient condition
is increasing in F and decreasing in K.
Proposition 5 Prices and quality. (i) Type U 's equilibrium price p U is increasing in F and , decreasing in K and , and independent of t.
(ii) Type T 's equilibrium price p T is increasing in , decreasing in and independent of t. It is decreasing (increasing) in F for F < (>) 1 2 K, and decreasing (increasing) in K for K < (>) 3 2 F . (iii) Type T 's equilibrium quality v T is decreasing in F and , increasing in K and , and independent of t.
Proposition 6 Market shares. (i) The market share of a single untalented …rm, s U , is increasing in K, and , and independent of t. It is increasing (decreasing) in F for F < (>) 
(ii) The market share of a single talented …rm, s T , is decreasing in F , increasing in K, and , and independent of t.
(iii) The total market share of talented types, S T , is decreasing in , and t. Comparative statics in F and K are ambiguous.
Proofs are given in the appendix. The results are summarized in Table 2 .
Impact of digitization
We wish to assess the impact of digitization. Digitization may be characterized as some combination of the following e¤ects:
reduction in …xed costs F and K, either individually, or together via (cheaper video storage, editing and transmission); reduction in the cost of raising quality (better special e¤ects, multiple camera angles in sports coverage, speedier news reporting); reduction in transport cost t (viewer familiarization; lower adaptation costs; also market expansion due to globalization).
A reduction in …xed cost for "basic"production F , on its own, increases the total number of …rms, as entry by untalented …rms is encouraged. If the su¢ cient condition (22) is met, it can be determined that the proportion of talented …rms falls. Untalented …rms cut their price, while talented types respond to increased competition from untalented types by raising their quality, thus increasing vertical di¤erentiation. Talented …rms …rst reduce price, but raise it again as F falls further, building their individual market shares throughout.
A reduction in …xed cost for "premium"production K, on its own, reduces the number of …rms and results in lower per-…rm market shares for both types. 20 If the su¢ cient condition (22) is satis…ed, it can be determined that the proportion of talented …rms rises. Untalented …rms raise price, while talented …rms invest less in quality, reducing vertical di¤erentiation, and …rst lower then (for further reductions in K) increase their prices. More clear-cut results are found when both exogenous …xed costs move together. A proportionate reduction via a fall in does not alter the total number of …rms but increases the proportion of talented types, which then invest less in raising quality, reducing vertical di¤erentiation. With the intensi…cation of competition both types cut prices. Per-…rm market share falls for both types, but the total share of talented types increases.
A reduction in the cost of raising quality reduces the total number of …rms but increases both the proportion and total market share of talented types. Talented …rms invest more in quality, increasing vertical di¤erentia-tion. Prices charged by both types go up, while market per-…rm shares for both types decrease.
An increase in market size ("globalization"), as captured by a reduction in transport cost t, reduces the total number of …rms and increases both the proportion and total market share of talented types. In this formulation there is no change in quality or in prices of either type, nor in any individual …rm's market share.
Discussion and conclusion
By examining and comparing the three models, the e¤ects of three developments linked to digitization can be assessed: cheaper quality, globalization, and lower (exogenous) …xed costs. Endogenous …xed costs play a key role: as described by Sutton (1991) , various market developments a¤ect …rms'incentive to invest in raising quality, increasing their (endogenous) …xed costs and altering the attractiveness of entry.
If quality becomes cheaper, …rms invest more, inhibiting entry and raising quality and price. With heterogeneous types, the second model illuminates the scope for vertical (quality) di¤erentiation. Firms with a relatively high quality cost do not invest in quality at all, preferring to produce basic products. Then, if quality becomes cheaper through digitization, the relatively productive …rms invest more and also raise their prices, increasing vertical di¤erentiation and widening price dispersion.
Endogenizing entry of each type, the third model also allows the mix of high-and low-quality products to change. If quality becomes cheaper, the endogenous …xed cost e¤ect reduces entry and increases vertical di¤erentia-tion (as before), but also raises both the proportion and total market share of high-quality products. Now, with lower entry of untalented …rms, reduced competition between basic products permits an increase in their price, as well as in that of high-quality products, implying that price dispersion does not necessarily increase.
Globalization raises the marginal return to quality, tending to induce …rms to invest more. With heterogenous …rms basic products are left unchanged, thus globalization increases vertical di¤erentiation and price dispersion. In all three models, the endogenous …xed cost e¤ect of globalization is so strong that number of …rms actually falls, rather than rising as the market expands. However, when product mix can change, rather than increasing quality globalization instead raises both the proportion and total market share of high-quality products. It would appear that the increased entry of, and competition between, talented …rms o¤sets the increased marginal return to quality resulting from globalization, leaving quality unchanged. However, the high-quality products come to dominate the market -as Hollywood did in the global movie market in the latter part of the 20th century.
Changes in exogenous …xed costs can be examined in the third model. Whether …xed cost reductions a¤ect low-or high-quality …rms makes a crucial di¤erence here. A reduction in the former increases the number of …rms (as in Salop (1979) ), increasing the range of products available to consumers, and may tend to increase the proportion of basic products (the "long tail"), while also increasing vertical di¤erentiation as talented …rms respond by raising quality. A lower exogenous …xed cost for talented …rms has the opposite e¤ect, reducing the number of …rms. This outcome appears to be the result of increased competition between types rather than endogenous …xed costs: talented …rms lower the quality of their output, reducing vertical di¤erentiation between these and basic products, which seems to inhibit entry overall. If exogenous …xed costs fall for both types proportionately, talented types gain a larger total share of the market, but again vertical di¤erentiation falls. In this case intensi…cation of competition between the two types causes both to cut prices. Thus, with its various impacts, digitization may have a number of di¤er-ent e¤ects. It is not inconsistent to …nd basic products taking a larger share of the market, even while more talented types increase their quality (this may happen when the …xed cost of making and distributing a low quality product -such as home video posted on YouTube -falls). Such an outcome increases the range of products available to consumers while also increasing vertical di¤erentiation between low-and high-quality products. However, other changes associated with digitization, such as lower-cost methods of improving quality, increase vertical di¤erentiation but reduce entry, decreasing the range of products on o¤er. The precise set of outcomes is sensitive to the nature of the changes brought about by digitization, and may depend on which are the dominant factors. Thus, although explanations may be found for observed trends, such as the rise of the hit parade in the late 20th century and growth of the long tail in the 21st, drawing precise predictions for the future is complex.
This paper has combined entry by horizontally di¤erentiated products, vertical di¤erentiation and endogenous entry by di¤erent "talent" types. Since the models are solving using free-entry conditions, …rms (in expectation at least) make no more than a normal return. Thus, although the distribution of …rms may be skewed, expected returns are not. A possible extension would be to incorporate a complementary input, the artist, which is in limited supply and must be combined with the endogenous quality input (say, high-quality production or special e¤ects) to produce a song or movie. A talented artist might then earn rents, akin to the skewed returns in the superstars literature, which are a¤ected by the costs of other inputs and demand changes. With this extension, the analysis might cast light on the earnings of top artists and producers in the digital age. Proof of Proposition 4. Proportion of talented types, =
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i) Price of untalented type,
F K < 0; dp U dt = 0.
(ii) Price of talented type,
K; dp T dK = (2K 3F )
(iii) Quality of talented type,
Proof of Proposition 6. 
(ii) Market share for a single, talented …rm,
(iii) Total shares of talented types,
(NB: total share of untalented types, S U = 1 S T :)
The signs of dS T dF and dS T dK are ambiguous.
